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Risk Factors versus Dollar Value: Changing How 
Weapon System Programs are Managed 
Robert Murphy—Robert Murphy retired as a member of the Senior Executive Service after a 
33-year career in the US Navy’s Nuclear Propulsion Program.  He finished his career as the 
Program’s  Director of Resource Management, responsible for budget, acquisition and logistic 
support.  While on active Government service, he participated in the acquisition of every 
nuclear submarine in the US fleet today, in addition to design contracts for SEAWOLF and 
VIRGINIA Class submarines.  Since retiring from public service, he has been consulting for 
both commercial and government organizations, specializing in major system acquisitions. 
Such projects have included several cost studies of VIRGINIA Class submarines, in addition 
to advising on the most recent multi-year contract for acquisition of these submarines.  RAND 
research projects have included several studies of the United Kingdom nuclear submarine 
industrial base. Murphy earned an MBA from George Washington University. 
Abstract 
The author discusses the current basis of the DoD’s management and oversight of 
MDAPs (i.e., their dollar value) and proposes a new paradigm in which the level of 
management and oversight would be based on the level of risk an MDAP represents.  The 
author also examines the extent to which the DoD is prepared to assess the following 
categories of risk: technical, system integration, design, production, and business. Finally, 
the author makes recommendations to improve the DoD’s ability to assess these risks. 
Preface  
Today’s defense environment is placing growing pressure on defense policymakers 
to be nimble and adaptive, particularly with respect to acquisition systems and processes. 
This occasional paper is one in a series drawing upon the expertise of core RAND 
Corporation staff to explore issues and offer suggestions on topics that are likely to be of 
critical importance to the new leadership: the use of competition, development of novel 
systems, prototyping, risk management, organizational and management issues, and the 
acquisition workforce. The papers are designed to inform new initiatives for markedly 
improving the cost, timeliness, and innovativeness of weapon systems that the Department 
of Defense (DoD) intends to acquire.  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requires review of Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs and decisions by senior officials on the basis of a program’s dollar 
value, irrespective of risk. In this paper, we propose a new paradigm in which the level of 
management and oversight would be based on the level of risk a program represents, 
including technical, system integration, design, production, and business innovation risk. We 
also examine the extent to which the DoD is prepared to assess these categories of risk and 
identify descriptive levels that could be used to assess and categorize design and business 
process risk.  
This study was sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) and conducted within the Acquisition 
and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally 





Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, 
the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.  
For more information on RAND’s Acquisition and Technology Policy Center, contact 
the Director, Philip Antón. He can be reached by e-mail at atpc-director@rand.org; by phone 
at 310-393-0411, extension 7798; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, 
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org.  
Introduction  
Currently, acquisition programs are grouped and then managed at the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) by dollar value— depending on the dollar value, the OSD 
provides different levels of oversight and different management processes. This approach 
has been constantly refined over the years, without having produced any noticeable 
improvement in terms of reducing the cost growth, schedule slippage, and performance 
shortfalls that continue to plague the acquisition of weapon system programs. This paper 
argues for a different paradigm: The level of overall risk inherent in a program should be the 
main basis for determining the process and level of review a project should receive.1  
Drawing upon examples from warship acquisition programs, this paper also argues 
that inadequate assessment and management of various discrete program risks results in 
adverse cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. We examine existing scales for 
assessing some of these discrete program risks and make recommendations to better 
assess and manage several programs within the Defense Acquisition Management System.  
Managing by Risk Level versus Dollar Value  
Currently, the OSD requires review of acquisition programs and decisions by senior 
officials on the basis of a program’s dollar value, irrespective of risk, as shown in Table 1.  
However, some very costly projects might have significantly less risk than projects of 
similar cost, and thus should require less oversight as well as the use of different criteria at 
milestone reviews.2  Conversely, projects may cost little but have a lot of risk because they 
tend to push the state of the art in technology and may also involve novel business or 
design processes that may require more comprehensive oversight than just dollar value 
would otherwise indicate. An excellent example of this type of program—the Advanced 
SEAL Delivery System (ASDS)—was discussed in a May 2007 report by the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). The ASDS is a Special Operations Forces’ 
battery-powered submersible, carried to a deployment area by a submarine. The operating 
parameters for the submersible required development of batteries that would push the state 
of the art in that technology. The initial design, construct, and deliver contract was awarded 
                                                
1 Cost is a factor that must be considered when determining the level of review. A multibillion dollar 
program requires high-level review because even a small amount of cost growth involves large dollar 
amounts. 
2 For example, the Navy is about to restart construction of two DDG 51-class destroyers at a cost in 
excess of several billion dollars. Over 60 destroyers of this class have already been delivered or are 
in the final stages of construction. Because of this track record, restarting construction of two new 
DDG 51s will no doubt expose the Navy to a far less risk of adverse cost, schedule, and performance 
outcomes than construction of three multibillion DDG 1000-class ships, which are now being 





for $70 million in 1994 for delivery in 1997; because of the dollar value, Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) resided with the Navy, which ultimately accepted delivery of ASDS in 2003 
in “as is” condition at a cost in excess of $340 million. The GAO concluded that “Had the 
original business case for ASDS been properly assessed as an under-resourced, concurrent 
technology, design, and construction effort led by an inexperienced contractor, DoD might 
have adopted an alternative solution or strategy” (GAO, 2007, p. 13). 
Table 1. Basis and Level of Program Oversight 
(USD(AT&L), 2008)  
Program Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) 
Basis for ACAT 
Designation Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA)  
Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) 
I Estimated total expenditure 
for research, development, 
test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) of more than $365 
million or for procurement of 
more than $2.190 billion 
ACAT ID: Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisitions, 
Technology, and Logistics 
ACAT IC: Head of DoD 
Component (e.g., Secretary 
of the Navy) or, if delegated, 
DoD component acquisition 
executive (e.g., Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and 
Acquisition)  
II Estimated total expenditure 
for RDT&E of more than 
$140 million or for 
procurement of more than 
$660 million 
DoD component acquisition 
executive or designate (e.g., 
program executive officer)  
III Does not meet criteria for 
ACAT II or above; less than 
an MAIS program ACAT ID: 
Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics 
Designated by DoD 
component acquisition 
executive at the lowest level 
appropriate (e.g., program 
manager)  
NOTE: Estimated expenditures are in FY 2000 constant dollars.  
Focusing on Causes Rather than Consequences  
Risk, or the exposure to the chance of failure, is a word heard frequently in the 
acquisition community. All acquisition programs face risk of some form or another. Arguably, 
any new major weapon system that could be developed, produced, and fielded with no risk 
involved is probably not worth acquiring.  
Overtly or otherwise, much of a program manager’s time is spent managing risk. 
After all, the Defense Acquisition Management System, shown in Figure 1, is, in essence, a 
risk-management process designed to ensure success in the timely delivery of weapon 






Figure 1. The Defense Acquisition Management System 
(USD(AT&L), 2008) 
The risks most frequently mentioned by defense acquisition officials are cost growth, 
schedule slippage, and performance shortfalls. This is not surprising as cost, schedule, and 
performance are the primary attributes by which programs are assessed for success or 
failure. Moreover, the Defense Acquisition University (n.d., p. 2) teaches that cost, or 
performance schedule, and performance are the risk factors that program managers must 
assess and manage “to ensure that DoD is acquiring optimum systems that meet all 
capability needs.”  
Assessment of cost, schedule, and performance is clearly a management task, and a 
good program manager assesses these risks using periodic data accumulated into 
management reports to identify problems, regain lost ground, and then stay on track. 
However, these are broad measures of risk. A better program manager proactively manages 
by using discrete program risks and submeasures that allow him or her to look ahead and 
act to avoid adverse cost, schedule, and/or performance trends and outcomes. In other 
words, managing by cost, schedule, and performance measures is akin to driving a car 
while looking solely in the rearview mirror—it is possible, but only if the road stays straight. A 
better driver looks mostly out the windshield, with only an occasional look in the mirror; this 
driver anticipates and easily handles curves in the road.  
In this paper, we focus on five discrete programmatic risk categories:  
 technical,  
 system integration, 
 design,  
 production, and  
 business.  
Taken together, these risk categories portray overall acquisition program risk.3  They 
interact in numerous ways to affect a project’s cost, schedule, and/or performance 
outcomes: Obviously, technologies that do not work affect performance, but so can poor 
business decisions that increase cost and lead to features being deleted from the weapon 
system to remain within budget.  
                                                
3 For simplicity, risks involved in fielding, operating, and maintaining the weapon system are not 





The Defense Acquisition Management System appears to adequately recognize that 
incorporation of new technologies into a weapon system presents risk, providing metrics to 
systematically assess this type of risk. Time is also provided in the acquisition process for 
system integration matters to be identified and resolved, although there is room for 
improvement. However, as will be discussed in subsequent examples, new approaches in 
design, production, and business areas of acquisition programs do not appear to receive the 
same skepticism and comprehensive oversight that new technologies and systems receive. 
 Well-Defined Process for Assessing Technical Risk Is in Place  
“Technical risk” is exposure to the chance that development of critical technologies 
will not meet program objectives within cost and schedule constraints. In assessing 
technical risk, program managers must address the uncertainty in their estimates about how 
much time and effort it will take to make new technologies work. The importance of technical 
risk is well understood in the acquisition community. For example, DoD guidance states that 
“the management and mitigation of technology risk…is a crucial part of overall program 
management and is especially relevant to meeting cost and schedule goals” (USD(AT&L), 
2008, para. 3.7.2.2).  
Technical risk is also extensively addressed in the Defense Acquisition Management 
System. The system recognizes evolutionary acquisition as the preferred DoD strategy for 
rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user. One purpose of evolutionary acquisition 
(i.e., delivering capability in increments through spiral or incremental development) is to 
provide time to better manage technology risk and avoid adverse cost and schedule 
outcomes that often result from trying to achieve difficult requirements in one step.  
The DoD has also established a well-defined process based on Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRLs) to categorize technical risk and help ensure that key decision-
makers understand the risk of incorporating different technologies into weapon system 
acquisition programs (the TRLs are described in Table 2). Using this process, program 
offices conduct a technology readiness assessment under the auspices of the DoD 
Component Science and Technology (S&T) Executive; the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (S&T) evaluates the technology readiness assessment and forwards findings to the 
Overarching Integrated Product Team leader and Defense Acquisition Board.  
The TRLs are a good proxy measurement for technical risk: The lower the readiness 
level, the more development needed to incorporate the technology into a weapon system; 
and the more development needed, the greater the risk. Overall, technology risk has been 
handled fairly well in warship acquisition programs, which tend not to push the state of the 
art in technology as far as do weapons and sensors. A recent example is the USS Virginia, 
which incorporates various new technologies4 and was still delivered within four months of 
the original schedule established a decade earlier (Casey, 2007). 
                                                
4 For example, a nonpenetrating photonics mast versus a periscope, a DC electric system, 





Table 2. Technology Readiness Levels 
(DUSD(S&T), 2005) 
Technology Readiness Levels 
1. Basic principles observed and reported  
1. Technology concept and/or application formulated  
2. Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof 
of concept  
3. Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment  
4. Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment  
5. System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant 
environment  
6. System prototype demonstration in an operational environment  
7. Actual system completed and qualified through test and 
demonstration  
8. Actual system proven through successful mission operations  
NOTE: See Mankins (1995).  
System Integration Risk Is Assessed, But at Later Stages  
The acquisition community also assesses system integration risk, but it lacks 
effective tools to measure and categorize this risk early in a program’s life cycle. “System 
integration risk” is exposure to the chance that new and existing technologies being 
employed in a weapon system may not work together and/or interact with operators and 
maintainers to meet program objectives within cost and schedule constraints. System 
integration can be an issue within an individual acquisition program (e.g., when subsystems 
fail to interact). It can also be an issue between acquisition programs: Many programs 
develop capabilities that are a component of a larger warfighting capability; individually, the 
component programs might appear to be a low or moderate risk, but in combination with 
other programs, the overall risk might be much higher due to coordination and integration 
issues. A classic example occurred during the Grenada invasion when Army and Navy 
communications systems did not interact well during the joint operation.  
System integration risk is extensively treated after Milestone B, during the 
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase, at which time a program should 
demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility (USD(AT&L), 2008, para. 
3.7.1.1). While appropriate attention is given to system integration risk during this phase, 
this assessment occurs after the second of three milestones in the process, when programs 
have typically built up so much momentum that they are difficult to stop, regardless of 
performance or progress. Early consideration of system integration risk—at Milestone A—by 
senior decision-makers could result in developing and funding integration-risk mitigation 





Combat systems in warships provide an example of the problems that arise when 
decisions are made without adequate consideration of system integration risk.5 For example, 
early decisions on systems architecture and processing approaches made without adequate 
consideration of risk led to cost, schedule, and performance problems with submarine 
combat systems for the SSN 688I, SEAWOLF, and Australian Collins-class submarines. 
According to a report for the Parliament of Australia discussing the Collins-class submarine,  
Of the early decisions in the Collins program, the one which was to have the most 
public effect was that concerning the nature of the vessels’ Combat Data System 
(CDS). It has been the subsequent failure of this system to meet its design 
requirements that has left the submarines with a severely impaired combat capability.  
By the end of 1982…[the Royal Australian Navy (RAN)] had decided that the 
electronic combat systems of the new boats would be fully integrated. Instead of the 
then standard central computer performing all data analysis, the new submarine CDS 
would use a data bus to distribute information to a number of smaller computer work 
stations. (Woolner, 2001) 
The report then goes on to discuss the lack of appreciation for the risk of switching to 
the new integrated architecture for combat systems.  
The RAN was not alone in its “grand folly.”… The Australian information technology 
(IT) industry assured the RAN of both the feasibility and inherent advantages of a 
fully integrated combat system and of its ability to contribute to such a program.  
Moreover, the RAN was not the only navy to think that the future of combat data 
processing lay with fully integrated systems. The USN [U.S. Navy] specified the 
same concept for its [BSY-2] Integrated Combat System for the U.S. Navy’s Seawolf 
class nuclear attack submarines. This was an even more costly failure than the 
Collins CDS, absorbing…$1.5 billion [in U.S. dollars] before it was cancelled.6  
Tools for assessing system-integration maturity earlier on have been proposed. For 
example, Sauser, Ramirez-Marquez, Magnaye, and Tan (2008) have proposed a System 
Readiness Level (SRL) index that would incorporate the current TRL scale as well as an 
Integration Readiness Level (IRL) scale. The IRL scale they describe would use nine levels, 
which appear compatible with the widely used TRLs and appear to be a good proxy 
measurement of system integration risk. The proposed IRLs are listed in Table 3.  
The Risks of Design Process Management Are Not Well 
Understood  
“Design risk” is exposure to the chance that the weapon system’s design will not 
result in effective operation or be easy to produce. It is axiomatic that a good design is 
essential to a weapon system’s performance, but the impact of design on a weapon 
system’s production cost and schedule outcome is not as well appreciated. However, deci-
sions made early in the design process quickly establish not only the performance but also 
the ease of manufacture and resultant cost of the weapon system. While the ability of the 
                                                
5 A combat system integrates information from sensors, synthesizes this information for combat 
commanders, and provides fire control solutions and guidance to weapons. 





design to operate effectively can be considered a subset of technical risk, a more holistic 
approach is for a program manager to assess the chance that the design process to be 
employed for the weapon system will generate an effective, easy-to-produce weapon.  
Table 3. Integration Readiness Levels 
(Sauser et al., 2008) 
Integration Readiness Levels 
2. An interface between technologies is identified with sufficient detail to allow 
characterization of the relationship.  
1. There is some level of specificity to characterize the interaction (i.e., 
ability to influence) between technologies through their interface.  
2. There is compatibility (i.e., a common language) between 
technologies to orderly and efficiently integrate and interact.  
3. There is sufficient detail in the quality and assurance of the integration 
between technologies.  
4. There is sufficient control between technologies necessary to 
establish, manage, and terminate the integration.  
5. The integrating technologies can accept, translate, and structure 
information for their intended application.  
6. The integration of technologies is verified and validated with sufficient 
detail to be actionable.  
7. Actual integration is completed and mission qualified through test and 
demonstration in the system environment.  
8. Integration is mission proven through successful mission operations.  
The design process necessary for an effective and producible weapon system 
involves complex interactions between designers, suppliers, production experts, planners, 
and estimators. Design process complexity has also increased with the availability of more 
sophisticated design tools such as electronic product models and computational techniques 
(e.g., finite element analysis).  
Outcomes from two current acquisition programs—the United Kingdom’s ASTUTE-
class submarine and the US Navy’s LPD 17-class of amphibious transport dock ships—
demonstrate why senior decision-makers in the OSD acquisition process need to better 
understand the risks new design processes and tools present.  The ASTUTE was the first 
UK submarine to be designed through use of an electronic, three-dimensional computer 
product model.  The prime contractor’s inability to manage this new process resulted in 
extensive delays when design products needed to build the ship were late. General 
Dynamics ultimately had to be hired to augment and manage the final stages of the sub-
marine’s detail design process. Because of design and other problems, the ASTUTE 
program has overrun cost greatly and is years behind schedule.  
With LPD 17, the US Navy competed the design and production of the first three 
ships of the class using as major evaluation and award criteria (1) the plans for 





(IPDE) tools, and (3) life-cycle cost projections; these criteria were given more weight than 
price (Comptroller General of the United States, 1997). The then-Avondale Shipyard in New 
Orleans, Louisiana, partnered with a firm that was developing a new ship design IPDE tool 
and won the competition. Subsequently, the LPD 17 experienced considerable cost growth 
(about 70%) and schedule delays (CRS, 2008, p. 12). The GAO attributed much of this cost 
growth to the new design tool:  
In the LPD 17 program, the Navy’s reliance on an immature design tool led to 
problems that affected all aspects of the lead ship’s design. Without a stable design, 
work was often delayed from early in the building cycle to later, during integration of 
the hull. Shipbuilders stated that doing the work at this stage could cost up to five 
times the original cost. The lead ship in the LPD class was delivered to the warfighter 
incomplete and with numerous mechanical failures. (GAO, 2007) 
Senior decision-makers should require a program manager proposing to use new 
design processes, tools, or organizations to design a weapon system to justify selection of 
the new process, tool, or organization and develop an appropriate risk mitigation plan. An 
example of a design process mitigation plan comes from the VIRGINIA-class submarine 
program. Prior to VIRGINIA-class construction using a new Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) approach, Electric Boat stated,  
a representative section of the ship about a year early with a portion of that section 
started about two years early. This early, controlled, closely monitored ship 
construction effort ensured thorough preparation for full-ship application and high 
confidence in the new process. (General Dynamics Electric Boat, 2002, p. 33)  
Evaluation of Production Risks Lacks Rigor  
An earlier and more rigorous evaluation of production risks could save the DoD much 
difficulty and taxpayers a lot of money. “Production risk” is exposure to the chance that the 
facility, labor, manufacturing processes, and procedures will fail to produce the weapon 
system within time and cost constraints. Producibility—or “production capability”—is a func-
tion of the design; production facilities; management skills, processes, and experience; and 
workforce skills and experience. The DoD requires assessment of contractors’ production 
capability before production contract award in the production and deployment phase, but 
this may be too late because, at this point, production may be locked in by the organization 
that won the design contract. Moreover, in the authors’ experience, and as exemplified in 
the LPD 17 source-selection criteria discussed earlier, the production category of risk does 
not receive the same emphasis in selecting a shipbuilder as other factors, such as design 
concepts, past performance, and estimated cost.  
The Navy’s DD 963-class of destroyers and LHA 1-class of amphibious assault ships 
are classic examples of programs in which the DoD considered design and production risk 
acceptable when awarding contracts, but which went on to experience about the worst of 
every production factor possible. These ships presented little technical and system 
integration risk, but ended up far behind schedule and over cost, due in part to identifiable 
production risks. Contracts were awarded to the lowest bidder, Litton Industries, which 
owned the Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. In the late 1960s, Litton Industries 
decided to invest in an expansion of design and production facilities for warships, building a 
new shipyard on the west bank of the Pascagoula River, across from its existing shipyard. 
The new shipyard was designed to be operated with a new production control system using 





After the award of the LHA- and DD 963-class contracts to Ingalls for nine LHAs and 
30 DD 963s in the late 1960s, Ingalls’ management decided to shift construction of some 
commercial container ships from the old, conventional yard to the new facility (Northrup 
Grumman, 2008). The expectation was that doing so would allow the new facility to start up 
and have any problems worked out while the LHA and DD 963 were being designed. 
However, production of the container ships using the new control system led to delays; 
consequently, the ships were occupying facilities and using manpower needed to start 
production of the LHAs and DD 963s. Production of the LHAs and DD 963s fell far behind 
and, in combination with other problems (design-related issues, inflation, etc.), the costs 
were overrun substantially and the ships were late (GlobalSecurity.org, 2008).  
A greater emphasis on evaluating production risks could have saved an enormous 
amount of time and money, but the promised cost savings resulting from construction in a 
new, state-of-the-art ship fabrication and assembly facility proved too good to be true. The 
assessment that the facility would be derisked by building container ships first turned out to 
be wrong, and, meanwhile, two entire classes of ships had been priced and placed under 
contract.  
A promising approach, initiated by the Missile Defense Agency, may provide 
program offices across the DoD with better insight about production risk. The agency 
extended the notion of TRLs to engineering and manufacturing by developing Engineering 
and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (EMRLs) to assess the maturity of a program’s design, 
related materials, tooling, test equipment, manufacturing, quality, and reliability levels. There 
are five EMRLs, as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Levels 
(DUSD(S&T), 2005)  
Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Levels 
3. System, component, or item validation in laboratory environment or initial 
relevant engineering application or breadboard, brass-board development.  
1. System or components in prototype demonstration beyond 
breadboard, brass-board development.  
2. System, component, or item in advanced development. Ready for 
low-rate initial production.  
3. Similar system, component, or item previously produced or in 
production. System, component, or item in low-rate initial production. 
Ready for full-rate production.  
4. Identical system, component, or item previously produced or in 
production. System, component, or item in full-rate production.  
The Risk of Early Business Decisions Is Not Fully Appreciated  
Business decisions made early in a program’s life can significantly affect cost, 
schedule, and performance outcomes. “Business risk” is exposure to the chance that the 
overall acquisition strategy for a program will not result in the desired cost, schedule, and/or 
performance outcomes. Decisions about the process to select who will build the weapon 





all entail risk that is not always appreciated up front. To evaluate business risk, program 
managers should assess the following: (1) the extent to which the acquisition strategy can 
result in selection of the most effective, efficient design and most effective, efficient 
production entities; (2) whether cost estimates and schedules are valid; (3) whether proper 
government oversight organizations are in place; and (4) whether project personnel with 
proper training and experience are available.  
A good example of early business decisions gone bad is the Navy’s Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) Program. The lead ship, USS Freedom (LCS 1), was recently delivered after 
experiencing substantial cost overruns and delivery delays. In congressional testimony 
given to explain these outcomes, the US Navy (2007) identified the following tenets of the 
new business model used to acquire the LCS:  
 Construction of LCS seaframes in midtier shipyards that “perform predominately 
commercial work, maintaining business processes and overhead structures that 
keep them competitive in the world market” (i.e., little warship experience).7  
 “A rapid 24-month build cycle for each seaframe, as opposed to the five or more 
years that have become the norm in naval shipbuilding.”  
 “The LM lead ship detail design and construction effort was initiated 
simultaneously and the lead ship commenced construction only seven months 
after the start of final design (i.e., concurrent design/build).”  
 “In order to address the challenges of technical authority under this environment 
(reduction in NAVSEA technical personnel), in February 2003, NAVSEA and 
PEO Ships made two joint decisions. The first was to work with the American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS) to develop a set of standards (Naval Vessel Rules) 
that could be applied to non-nuclear naval combatant ships. The second was to 
utilize ABS to class8 both LCS and DDG 1000 using the new rules.”  
No doubt there were good arguments for these individual program tenets. However, 
the cumulative effect of the risks involved in building a new design warship in small 
commercial shipyards with little warship experience during a rapid, concurrent design/build 
process and to a set of technical standards themselves under development appears to have 
been greatly underappreciated. In that same congressional testimony, the Navy identified 
cost drivers for LCS 1 as “concurrent design-and-build while incorporating Naval Vessel 
Rules (NVR), reduction gear delays created by a manufacturing error, and insufficient 
program oversight” (US Navy, 2007). The risks inherent in utilizing an entirely new business 
model to acquire warships were obviously neither adequately assessed nor managed.  
One way to avoid such risk would be to require program managers proposing new 
and/or radical business models to fully justify why the new model is superior to past practice, 
recommend more frequent assessment points than now required by the Defense Acquisition 
Management System, and incorporate exit strategies in contracts for the government to use 
if the program fails to meet expectations.  
                                                
7 To better understand the differences between military and commercial shipbuilding, see Birkler et al. 
(2005). 
8  The American Bureau of Ships is known in the commercial shipping industry as a “classification 
society,” which is an organization that sets standards for design and construction of vessels and 






The Defense Acquisition System Framework has sufficient tools and allows time for 
proper assessment and management of technical risk and, to some extent, of system 
integration risk. However, design, production, and business risks are not always adequately 
assessed and managed. As shown in this discussion, scales exist that represent good proxy 
measurements of technical, systems integration, engineering, and production risks; what is 
missing are descriptive levels that could be used to assess and categorize design and 
business process risk. We recommend that the DoD explore establishing such levels and, in 
Tables 5 and 6, offer starting points for doing so (based on the authors’ experience), which 
may help program managers more carefully consider these risks.  
In addition, we recommend the following actions to better assess and manage 
program risk overall:  
 Assess, categorize, and individually review each technical, system, design, 
production, and business risk of a program at each milestone in the Defense 
Acquisition Management Framework.  
 Require program managers to justify new or radical approaches to design, 
production, or business processes and develop and implement risk mitigation 
plans and/or contract off -ramps.  
Table 5. Proposed Design Process Levels 
Design Processes 
1. New, unproven processes. New design tools under development. 
New design organization.  
2. Large expansion of existing design organization. Many new designers 
and supervisors unfamiliar with design tools and processes.  
3. Existing design organization using radically changed design tools, 
processes, and/or technologies.  
4. Experienced design organization using new design tools with proven 
processes.  






Table 6. Proposed Business Process Levels 
Business Processes  
4. Using a new, unproven approach to source selection. Encouraging new 
sources of supply. Acquiring new technologies without well-established cost-
estimating relationships. Requiring new government and/or contractor 
organizations to be formed.  
1. Using new procurement process in established industry. Cost-
estimating relationships only at high levels. Requires expansion of 
government and contractor organizations.  
2. Evolutionary change from prior acquisition strategies. Good cost-
estimating relationships. Existing government and contractor 
organizations can easily adapt to changes.  
3. Using same approach to buying similar products. Well-established 
cost-estimating relationships exist. Experienced government and 
contractor organizations involved.  
4. Acquiring more of what has been successfully bought before. Using 
the same contractor and government organizations.  
Although such tools would enhance the ability of program offices to assess and 
manage risk, the DoD should also consider changes in oversight. As stated at the outset of 
this paper, the current acquisition system requires review and decisions by senior officials 
on the basis of a program’s dollar value, irrespective of risk. A better use of their limited time 
may be to focus on programs with high risks, letting less-senior officials deal with lower-risk 
programs, regardless of dollar value. For example, the DoD could  
 lower the MDA level for future milestones down  
– —two levels for programs with low risk in all risk categories9 
– —one level for programs with moderate risk in all risk categories.10 
 continue to follow the patterns for decision authority as established in the 
Defense Acquisition Management System for any program with greater than 
moderate risk in any of the five categories of program risk.  
In this way, senior decision-makers might be able to better concentrate their limited 
time on the real potential problem areas in a program before problems occur, and direct 
actions to be taken to avoid and/or mitigate potential problems.  
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